Executive Summary
Comparable in strength to Cyclone Nargis, Cyclone Giri, category 4, made landfall in Rakhine State at 8pm, Friday, 22 October 2010. Two days prior the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) and Government began the early warning and evacuation of most residents either to higher ground, conveniently located within kilometers of the coast, or to strong buildings located close by. This early action most likely dramatically reduced the loss of life which was less than 100 persons - compared to over 100,000 only two and a half years before in Nargis. Immediately after the cyclone, the Government allowed MRCS, local NGOs and in situ INGO national staff, to make assessments and provide humanitarian assistance. However, similar to Nargis, international staff and new INGOs were not allowed to visit the area until nearly 2 months after (mid December).
Cyclone Giri hit an impoverished and politically sensitive area 2 weeks before national elections. The Government asked the UN to keep a humanitarian operation „low profile‟. Thus the Humanitarian Coordinator (simultaneously the Resident Coordinator) requested the implementation of an „informal‟ cluster system in Yangon. Thirteen days after Giri, when more information became available regarding the extent of damage and persons affected (260,000), the cluster system was officially activated with a letter sent to the Emergency Relief Coordinator. Seventeen days later application was made to the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) and a month later a general appeal made to donors (22 Nov). However, the UN never made an international “Flash” appeal for funds. Similarly, at the request of MRCS, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) did not make an appeal. The „low profile‟ approach to the disaster made a more transparent humanitarian operation difficult, resulting in delays in information, funding and action. It also had an impact on what to expect from clusters in terms of their normal roles and responsibilities.
In this context, within 3 days of Giri, IFRC convened the first „informal‟ Emergency Shelter and NFI cluster (ESC) and managed for 3 weeks with existing in-country international staff with some previous ESC experience. When the clusters were formally activated, IFRC sent for another 2 months, two Myanmar staff with international ESC experience as information managers. IFRC was the only organisation to send a dedicated team, while other agencies used existing senior and information management staff, and in at least one case some added capacity. In January, nearly 3 months after Giri, the ESC was phased out and handed over to the Shelter Working Group led by UN Habitat who has a relatively strong presence in country, given their Nargis recovery programme.
With regards to performance, in general the IFRC was quick to take responsibility for Emergency Shelter (and NFI) coordination, working with existing human resources. When the cluster system was formally activated, and at the same time the Delegation realised existing staff would not be enough, the Delegation and Global Shelter Cluster acted quickly to provide additional support. Basic coordination responsibilities with regard to emergency shelter were met in terms of reducing gaps and duplications and promoting a quality response. Despite delays in funding and an even more challenging terrain than the Delta, basic shelter materials were distributed to 70% of the affected population by the end of January (3 months). However the quality and coverage of non-food items (NFI) was less successful with more 40-50% of affected villages still requiring additional NFI assistance in February. Inter-cluster coordination in this regard, with WASH and Health, could have been much better. The ESC succeeded in being able to report on basic emergency shelter needs, and resource shortfalls. However confusion due to the combined reporting on emergency shelter and NFI kits and between emergency and early recovery needs created early misperceptions that overall shelter needs were met. As a result donors, who were reportedly disinterested in funding early recovery, were slow to fill in the gap for transitional and more permanent shelter materials. Information management was negatively impacted by some agencies poor information systems and lack of participation in the ESC by important shelter and NFI actors, including some UN agencies. The ESC‟s (and other clusters‟) job was further complicated as OCHA/MIMU did not always use and reinforce the cluster as the primary source of information contrary to established Guidelines.
The terms of reference for the ESC were minimised to information management and setting standards for shelter and were never revisited, contributing to different expectations by cluster members. ESC participation was mixed with at first a very few (3) active agencies leading on shelter kit distribution and later a few early recovery actors ensuring transition was on the agenda. However, the latter with mixed results given a lack of an initial and adequate needs assessment. ESC leadership structures could have been more robust, enabling as a cohesive group, more strategic decision making, advocacy, timely action and problem solving, the latter particularly to avoid problems of poor information exchange, poor township-regional-national communication, and the timely mis-en-oeuvre of early recovery. There was no significant „co-leadership‟ or a strategic advisory group. Later activities of the ESC team focused almost primarily on tracking and reporting actual distributions. While the discussion and advocacy around the sheltering process and the importance of a timely transition to semi-permanent and permanent structures was delayed. UN Habitat was an active participant throughout the lifetime of the ESC but only took a more proactive role in month two, when it co-led the implementation of a comprehensive shelter assessment that later informed an early recovery strategy. Having said this, transition to early recovery was much timelier than in Nargis and the Shelter Working Group has since made up for this delay by effective lobbying with donors.
The ESC team sent to Myanmar, comprised of Myanmar nationals, was an important precedent. Regardless of nationality, when an ESC team is sent without considerable coordination experience additional support is needed both by global and regional shelter cluster experts but also by the Head of Delegation, to whom the ESC team is also accountable. In the case of Myanmar, strategic action by the Delegation without being time consuming could have made the ESC more effective, particularly in inter-cluster meetings with the RC/HC and other heads of missions and in interactions with the MRCS. Having a team that knows the country and can speak the language has advantages, in terms of involving local actors and information exchange. However the ESC‟s effectiveness was compromised when it was not permitted to travel to affected areas because of MRCS‟ concerns. It is also clear that the international system for coordination of humanitarian assistance is in fact very foreign and those who do not know the lexicon, mechanisms, and nor work in the same style as that of the international humanitarian community are prejudiced against. As „nationalising‟ disaster management and response is the only correct and sustainable option, building more national capacity is the responsibility the humanitarian community. This is particularly true in Myanmar, where the way disasters are managed is changing, as exemplified in the Tachilek earthquake where the Government and other national actors, e.g. the MRCS, had very prominent roles in coordination. Recommendations are further detailed at the end of the report.